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FIGHT AGAINST MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this project is to use analysis and modeling techniques of 
Systems Dynamics to capture the causal relationships of Middle Eastern groups’ terrorist 
activities against the U.S. based on their ideological drivers, as well as the effect of U.S. 
policies that create dynamics and affect performance and outcomes. The main focus of 
this analysis is the terrorist groups’ human resources. The hypothesis is that Middle 
Eastern terrorism against the U.S. is affected by the U.S. level of military presence and/or 
investment in the Middle Eastern nations. A considerable and lasting reduction in 
fatalities originated by Middle Eastern groups’ terrorist attacks against the U.S. can be 
achieved through a policy that reduces both the human resources available to terrorist 
groups and their attack capability (level of sophistication). The study covers the 
implications of this resource reduction policy, which may include incremental military 
investment, defection motivators, anti-terrorism and the use of counter-terrorism 
operations. These operations will reduce the sophistication as well as the recruitment rate 
to levels where the functionality of terrorist cells will be impaired, and thus unable to 
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A. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT EVENTS 
Boosted by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Middle Eastern terrorist 
organizations have moved to the forefront of threats to U.S. national security. Most of 
these organizations were founded in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, but since the  
1990s they have significantly underlined their presence through the increase in lethality 
of their missions.   
It is quite telling that five of the seven sponsor states1 that are included in an 
official U.S. government terrorist list2 are located in the Middle East3. On the other hand, 
it is worth noting that, during 2003, fewer attacks were carried out against the U.S. in the 
Middle East than in either Latin America or Europe. There is no doubt that the September 
11th attacks have forcibly challenged the belief of many Americans that they live under 
an invulnerable U.S. umbrella, and have also revived memories linked to the Pearl 
Harbor attack in the Second World War. 
Before September 11th, terrorism was characterized by the U.S. administration as 
one problem among many other big issues of U.S. security. After the attacks, terrorism 
came to occupy the dominant position among the affairs typically addressed in all U.S. 
security policy discussions4.  
                                                 
1 The Middle East sponsor states are: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan. The other two are: Cuba and 
North Korea.  
2 Patterns of Global Terrorism, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 
29, 2004, available on the Internet: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31751.htm [last accessed June 
01, 2005]. 
3 In Figures 1, 2 and 3 brief descriptions of terrorism through statistics that are based on regional 
factors, source: From DOD (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), Patterns of Global Terrorism 
2003 April 29, 2004 Appendix G, available on the Internet: 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31751.htm [last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
4 Raphael Perl, Issue Brief for Congress, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy (The Library 




























Figure 1.   Total International Casualties from Terrorist Acts by Region in the Last 
Six Years, (Source: from DOD (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 April 29, 2004 Appendix G) 
 Figure 1 supports the previous discussion of America becoming more concerned 
with terrorism after September 11, 2001. The graph illustrates that, for a period of six 
years (1998-2003) and with the exception of 9/11, there were no casualties from major 
terrorist acts in North America; it also shows that approximately 4,465 fatalities resulted 
from the traumatic events of 9/11.  Although speculative and thus highly debatable, it 
could also be inferred that the U.S. became a target of major terrorist acts after its 
incursions in the Middle East in the 70s and 80s (closer interactions or hostilities with 











Figure 2.   Total International Terrorist Attacks by Region in the Last Six Years, 
(Source: from DOD (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), Patterns of 
Global Terrorism 2003 April 29, 2004 Appendix G) 
  
Figure 2 depicts the number of terrorist attacks per region in the last six years. 
Surprisingly, the Middle East is not the most dangerous place, with regard to terrorism, as 
it is perceived to be by many. Latin America, Asia and Western Europe all have greater 
incidences of terrorist attacks.   
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Figure 3.   Total Anti-US Attacks, 2003, (Source: from DOD (Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism), Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 April 29, 
2004 Appendix G)  
 
Figure 3 provides a more specific depiction of anti-U.S. attacks by region, type of 
event and type of target. The information was based on data for the year 2003. Only 13% 
of all anti-American attacks occurred in the Middle East region; the majority of attacks 
took place in Latin America. However, the degree of lethality of the Latin American 
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attacks was relatively low compared to those in the Middle East (Figure 1). It must also 
be noted that 88% of the attacks were bombing attacks and that 64% were against 
businesses. Only 12% of the attacks were against military, governmental, or diplomatic 
targets. This is an important detail that strongly relates to the actual definition of 
“Terrorism”. There are many different definitions of terrorism that have been adopted by 
official members of the international community. The academic consensus of the United 
Nations defines5 terrorism as follows: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to 
assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, 
or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought. 
When compared side by side, the definitions of terrorism vary depending on the 
source. As an illustration, an analysis performed by Alex P. Schmid6 on the use of 
definitional elements of terrorism compares the widely accepted characteristics of 
terrorism and assigns a weight to each one in terms of their frequency of use in official 
forums. In Table 1, twenty-one characteristics have been gathered according to the 
frequency of their appearance in the existing definitions. The most popular characteristic 
is violence/force (83.5%), followed by politics.  
                                                 
5 This definition is available on the Internet: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html 
[last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
6 Alex P. Schmid et al, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 




Table 1.   Frequencies of definitional elements in 109 definitions of terrorism 
(Source: from Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, 
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, 
Transaction Books, 1988)  
 
 
Element Frequency (%) 
Violence, force 83.5 
Political 65 
Fear, terror emphasized 51 
Threat 47 
(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5 
Victim-target differentiation 37.5 
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 32 
Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5 
Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian 
constraints 
30 
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 
Publicity aspect 21.5 
Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination 21 
Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims 17.5 
Intimidation 17 
Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 
Group, movement, organization or perpetrator 14 
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5 
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of 
violence 
9 
Clandestine, covert nature 9 
Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence 7 
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In order to analyze a specific terrorist group, specialists have chosen to use 
different techniques, some of them based on motivation and ideology, and others on 
objectives and levels of activity. Generally, the ones with the most significant levels of 
activity are the Latin American Groups, but in the area of lethality and popularity the 
scepter is kept by Islamic Groups7.  
An official document containing a list of identified terrorist organizations has 
been prepared by the US Department of State8; it is shown in Table 2. The fact that 48% 
of the groups who are on that list originate in the Middle East region is evidence enough 
to explain the significant and highly stressed presence of Middle Eastern terrorist 
organization9 matters in today’s U.S. political and foreign policy arenas. According to 
Kenneth Katzman, the popularity of these groups, as well as their economic strength, is 
the result of the displeasure in the Islamic World at the “unjust” treatment of Arabs in the 
Israeli-Arab peace process by the U.S. (double standard policy), or the “illegal10” 
invasion and occupation of Muslim lands11 (Operation Desert Storm against Iraq). 
It is broadly accepted that it is very difficult to find a solution, a remedy or cure 
against terrorism. Unfortunately, terrorism has existed for a long time and it is likely that 
it will continue to exist in the future. Perhaps the phrase: “Once a terrorist, always a 
terrorist,” reflects clearly not only the complications but also the difficulties experienced 
by governments in their efforts against terrorism. 
                                                 
7 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 
2002 (The Library of Congress, February 13, 2002), p. CRS-2. 
8 US Department of State Report Patterns of Global Terrorism (Office of Counterterrorism, 
Washington DC, April 29, 2004). The Middle Eastern Terrorist groups are in bold.  
9 In Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, it is attended to give a brief description of each one of these groups. 
10 There is no U.N. resolution to legalize the second Persian Gulf War. 
11 Kenneth Katzman, p. CRS-2. 
 8
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)  
2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade  
4. Ansar al-Islam  
5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)  
6. Aum Shinrikyo  
7. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  
8. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)   
9. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
10. Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)  
11. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)  
12. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)  
13. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  
14. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (Army of Mohammed)  
15. Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad  
16. Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  
17. Kahane Chai (Kach)  
18. Kongra-Gel/ PKK (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, 
KADEK)  
19. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)  
20. Lashkar i Jhangvi  
21. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
22. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)  
23. National Liberation Army (ELN)  
24. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  
25. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)  
26. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  
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27. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)  
28. al-Qa’ida  
29. Real IRA  
30. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  
31. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)  
32. Revolutionary Organization 17 November (R17N) 
33. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)  
34. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)  
35. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)  
36. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
 
Table 2.   U.S. Department of State Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations List 
(Source: from U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 




Table 2 provides the list of known terrorist organizations as recognized by the 
U.S. Department of State. Since this study will focus on the Middle Eastern groups (in 
bold font in Table 2), and to provide the reader with a general profile, Tables 3-6 present 
a concise description of the most relevant Middle Eastern groups. The source of this 
illustrative table is the reputable National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism database, available at their website: http://www.tkb.org   
 
 
Table 3.   A Brief Description of Some Fundamental Characteristics of Abu Nidal 
Organization (ANO), Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, al-Qa’ida, Ansar al-Islam 
(Source: from National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 












Table 4.   A Brief Description of Some Fundamental Characteristics of Armed 
Islamic Group, Hamas, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Mujahedin-e Khalq 
Organization (MEK)   (Source: from National Memorial Institute for the 
















Table 5.   A Brief Description of Some Fundamental Characteristics of Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC),  (Source: 
from National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database), 

















Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) 
 
Incidents Casualties Fatalities Incidents Casualties Fatalities 
72 90 20 6 12 3 
16 Domestic Incidents  5 Domestic Incidents  










While the group's activities are focused in 
Turkey, their funding comes from Western 
Europe, where much of the leadership is 
currently located. The group reportedly 
finances most of its operations through 










Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, 
especially in Western Europe; In addition, Algeria 
has accused Iran and Sudan of providing support to 
Algerian extremists  
Table 6.   A Brief Description of Some Fundamental Characteristics of 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C), Salafist Group for 
Call and Combat (GSPC) (Source: from National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism database), available on the Internet:  http://www.tkb.org 
 
B. RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
The war against terrorism includes two types of actions: antiterrorism (defensive 
measures) and counterterrorism (offensive measures). Antiterrorism involves "defensive 
measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to 
include limited response and containment by local military forces12." Counterterrorism is 
defined as “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism13.” 
Moreover, the goal for antiterrorism could be described as follows: “to prevent attacks as 
well as to minimize the effects if one should occur14”, while aiming to eliminate the 
terrorist organization and its political power. Conversely, counterterrorism includes 
                                                 
12 Kirkhope, The Basics: Combating Terrorism, (Terrorism Research Center, Jan 03, 2005), p. 1, 
available on the Internet: 
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5671&mode=thread 
[last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
13 Ibid., p. 5.  
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“spoiling action, deterrence, and response and follows a terrorist event15”. In the combat 
against terrorism, unity of efforts, legitimacy, patience, perseverance, and restraint are 
required.             
Based on their desire to defeat terrorism, nations often face a disharmony between 
goals and courses of action16. Raphael Perl argues that:  “The efforts to combat terrorism 
are complicated by a global trend towards deregulation, open borders, and expanded 
commerce17.”  Another unpleasant situation that can take place is the reduction of 
personal freedom or, even more onerously, the adoption of a myopic view on several 
fundamental human rights. Such unpleasant situations are usually characterized as 
“collateral losses”. 
Unfortunately, the structures that terrorist organizations use are totally different 
from those that the U.S. and its international partnerships, such as NATO, are used to 
dealing with. For instance, the NATO structure was not prepared to respond to suicide 
attacks against civilians inside cities. The September 11th incidents revealed that the U.S. 
had little recent practical experience in dealing with terrorist organizations.  
Analysts, in their endeavor to understand the function of a terrorist group, have 
come to the conclusion that there are three trends18 which best represent terrorist 
organizations. The first one is structural: the groups are loosely organized and self 
financed. The second is motivational: religiously or ideologically motivated organizations 
are predominant in the field of terrorism. The last trend is the creation and development 
of international links among terrorist organizations, which permit the exchange of 
technological information, political advice, and training. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 5. 
15 Kirkhope, p. 5. 
16 Raphael Perl, p. CRS-5. In consolidation democracies such as the United States, the constitutional 
limits within which a policy must operate are often seen by some to conflict directly with a desire to secure 
the lives of citizens against terrorist activity more effectively.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. CRS-8. 
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Besides these trends, it has to be mentioned that in the war against terrorism, the 
media remains as the most powerful force in confrontations between terrorists and 
governments 19.  Perl states: “Influencing public opinion may impact not only the actions 
of governments but also those of groups engaged in terrorist acts. From the terrorist 
perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or 
campaign. Conversely, governments can also use the media in their efforts to arouse 
world opinion against a state sponsor of terrorism or groups using terrorist tactics20.”  
                                                 
19 In Table 7 are described some potential uses of Mass Media. Source: from Alex P. Schmid and 
Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication (London, Sage, 1982), pp. 53-54. 
20  Raphael Perl, p. CRS-8. 
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1. Instill fear in a mass audience 
2. Polarize public opinion 
3. Gain publicity by agreeing to clandestine interviews 
4. Demand publication of a manifesto 
5. Provoke government overreaction 
6. Spread false and misleading information 
7. Bring about the release of prisoners 
8. Attract converts and support to a cause 
9. Coerce the media by assaulting journalists 
10. Profit from “free advertising” 
11. Discredit public officials while being held hostage 
12. Divert public attention by bombing their way onto front page 
13. Use the media to send messages to comrades to another country 
14. Excite public against the legitimate government 
15. Bolster the terrorist group’s morale 
16. Gain the Robin Hood image by fighting “injustice” 
17. Obtain information on counterterrorist strategies 
18. Identify future victims 
19. Acquire information about popular support for the terrorist group 
20. Exploit the exaggerated media image of a powerful, omnipotent group  
Table 7.   Uses of Mass Media by Modern Terrorist (Source: from Alex P. Schmid 
and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication (London, Sage, 1982), pp. 53-
54) 
Governments and international coalitions can use some “instruments” to combat 
international terrorism, such as: 
1. Economic Sanctions 
 Sanctions against regimes can be either unilateral or multilateral. Sanctions can 
be used against nations that have been characterized as sponsors or supporters of terrorist 
groups. Moreover, such actions can be targeted at capturing the assets of individual 
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terrorist organizations. Examples of blocked assets of Middle East Terrorism List States 
are described in Table 8. 
  
Country Assets in U.S. 
IRAN 
(added to terrorism list 
January 19, 1984) 
$23.2 million, consisting of blocked 
diplomatic property and related accounts. 
(A reported additional $400 million in 
assets remain in a Defense Dept. account 
pending resolution of U.S.-Iran military 
sales cases21) 
IRAQ 
(on list at inception, December 29, 1979. 
Removed March 1982, restored to list 
September 13, 1990) 
$2.356 billion, primarily blocked bank 
deposits. Includes $596 million blocked in 
U.S. banks’ foreign branches, and $173 
million in Iraqi assets loaned to a U.N. 
escrow account. 
SYRIA 
(on list since inception). No blocked assets. 
SUDAN 
(added August 12, 1993) $33.3 million in blocked bank deposits. 
LIBYA 
(on list since inception) 
$1.073 billion, primarily blocked bank 
deposits. 
 
Table 8.   Blocked Assets of Middle East Terrorism List States (As of End 2000), 
(Source: from 2000 Annual Report to Congress. January 2001) 
 
2.  Economic Inducements 
These inducements might include efforts to affect economic and social conditions 
to eliminate breeding grounds for terrorists. It has been indicated that “most terrorists 
worldwide are unemployed or underemployed, with virtually nonexistent prospects for 
economic advancement.”22 Some experts believe that the fight against poverty may 
constitute the main pillar in the battle against terrorism. Moreover, education could be the 
second  pillar. With  economic  wealth  and  education,  it  should  be  possible  to  reduce  
                                                 
21 Pincus, Walter. Bill Would Use Frozen Assets to Compensate Terrorism Victims. Washington Post, 
July 30, 2000. 
22 Raphael Perl, pp. CRS-9, 10. 
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terrorism through a change of lifestyle and culture in general. On the other hand, some 
others argue 23that these factors can only insignificantly influence terrorism because they 
occupy the lowest position in the list of terrorism motivators.  
3.  Covert Actions by the U.S. 
Covert action is defined by U.S. law as activity meant “to influence political, 
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly24.” Such actions are 
comprised mainly of passive monitoring in order to clarify the capabilities and the targets 
of the terrorist groups. Most of the time, covert actions have to deal with: the publicity of 
false information, promotion of divisions between the political and military branches of 
organizations, and conflicts between organizations. The most dangerous part of these 
actions appears when agents operate covertly in foreign countries. In the event that such 
operations are revealed, it is quite possible to create a significant diplomatic conflict 
between the U.S. and the foreign country. In addition, this category should include the 
“rewards for information” programs, based on the fact that money is a strong motivator. 
4.  Military Force 
The last, but not least, instrument that governments can use to combat 
international terrorism is military force. Perl claims that: “Successful use of military force 
for preemptive or retaliatory strikes presupposes the ability to identify a terrorist 
perpetrator or its state sponsor, as well as the precise location of the group, information 
that is often unavailable from U.S. intelligence sources25.” On the other hand, some 
analysts argue that military force could cause not only civilian casualties but also 
collateral damage to economic institutions in the operations area. In addition, such action 
could potentially inflate “terrorist groups’ sense of importance” and boost their 
recruitment effectiveness. A recent study26 of the sociology and psychology of terrorism 
                                                 
23 Raphael Perl 
24 Ibid., pp. CRS-9, 10. 
25 Ibid., p. CRS-12. 
26 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, 
(Library of Congress, September 1999), available on the Internet: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/frd.html 
[last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
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states that “counterterrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to 
radicalize large sectors of the Muslim population and damage the U.S. image 
worldwide.”   
Moreover, diplomacy and law enforcement cooperation could be used as potential 
tools in the “quiver” of governments’ arsenals. The aforementioned tools aim to fulfill the 
four goals of the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism27. The first goal is the 
reduction of the capabilities, as well as the scope, of operations that terrorist 
organizations can conduct. The second goal is the interdiction of the support and 
sponsorship networks of the terrorists. The third goal is the defense of U.S. citizens and 
their interests. The final and most difficult goal is the elimination of the societal 
conditions that facilitate the recruitment of new members for terrorist organizations. 
C.  SYSTEMS DYNAMICS PERSPECTIVE OF TERRORISM  
The preceding discussion was provided to enhance the understanding of the main 
drivers and assumptions that will be used for the purpose of this study.  For a long time, 
many research studies have resorted to the use of statistical correlation in order to 
strongly support their specific hypotheses or theories. The use of historical data allows 
researchers to relate frequencies or specific occurrences to certain events, time frame 
characteristics and/or populations, as well as enabling them to make inferences based on 
their observations.  
Conversely, system dynamics modeling allows the researcher to analyze complex 
systems from a cause-and-effect perspective, rather than from a statistical standpoint. It 
takes into account the feedback structure as well as the dynamic implications and non 
linearity within a particular system. Furthermore, system dynamics modeling allows us to 
track the various flows (such as material, money, and people) as well as any 
accumulations as they may occur throughout the system. Nevertheless, it is important to 
point out that the expected outcomes are not necessarily quantitative point predictions for 
a particular variable, but rather a measure of the dynamic behavior pattern of the system, 
given the inputs and conditions in the model. 
                                                 
27 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: February 2003), 
1-2. 
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In other words, the expected results are specific behavioral patterns that will assist 
in a better understanding of policies in place, or will help to find flaws in the 
organizational structures. The behavioral patterns can take many forms. The most 







Figure 4.   Common Modes of Behavior in Dynamic Systems. (Source: from John 
Sterman, Business Dynamics, Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex 
World, McGraw-Hill, (2000), Page 108) 
Given the high-level concerns of the U.S. government regarding Middle Eastern 
Terrorist Groups and their activities, the study will carefully look into these groups.  
Historical data and ideological characteristics of the most prominent Middle Eastern 
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, among others, will be used to create an 
aggregate profile that will treat the groups as one entity; this will simplify the preparation 
of a causal loop diagram28 that will clearly show the feedback structure of the proposed 
system The details about the diagram implemented in this project can be found in Chapter 
II.  
                                                 
28 Causal Loop Diagram: A map showing the causal links among variables with arrows from a cause 
to an effect.  Definition by John Sterman, “Business Dynamics, Systems Thinking and Modeling for a 














The quantitative analysis part of this project was performed with the assistance of 
computer software developed by ISEE Systems, called Stella®. The study’s goal was to 
properly capture the variables and factors that are relevant to the system; once developed, 
the model was tested and analyzed. The main areas of interest were the number of fatal 
victims per month (number of killed/month) and the number of terrorists (Terrorist 
Human Resources). However, the main hypothesis is that if a policy could be crafted to 
diminish or disrupt the recruitment, and thus reduce the number, of terrorists, that policy 
would be able to accomplish a considerable and lasting reduction in the number of attacks 
against the U.S. and thus reduce the number of fatal victims per month. 
It is understood that the problem of terrorism will not disappear overnight and 
that, because of its nature, it may not disappear in the long run either. However, if the 
aforementioned policy is implemented, it could lead to a lower level of anti-U.S. terrorist 
actions. 
The desired optimal behavioral pattern for the number of terrorists would be an 
exponential decrease, with the goal of achieving a minimum realistic level. The desired 
optimal behavioral pattern for the number of attacks would also be an exponential 
decrease, with the goal of eventual low numbers. However, given that violent acts are 
typically carried out by small groups of people, with a lack of strength or resources to 
attack openly and seeking the necessary attention to keep their causes alive, attacks will 
still occur. Hopefully, these attacks will not be with the same intensity that they would be 
if the terrorists had greater strength.           
D.  PROJECT OUTLINE 
This project serves as a starting point for the study of, and experimentation with, 
policies aimed at fighting Middle Eastern terrorism against the United States. This is 
achieved through the creation of a dynamic system that captures the causal relationship 
of: Middle Eastern terrorism, the drivers that motivate recruitment as well as its violent 
actions, and the effect of U.S. responses.  
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The preceding factors are then divided into smaller components and the governing 
parameters quantified accordingly; these actions bring the resulting dynamic model closer 
to reality and thus make it more useful for policy testing. 
Again, the resulting model is simulated in a virtual environment using Stella®, a 
reliable systems dynamic software tool. The model re-creates the current situation, 
reproducing the actual system as it is depicted in the causal loop diagram. However, it is 
important to remember that, although they follow the same principle, the causal diagram 
does not show the amount of detail that the model structure reflects. 
Following the re-creation of the current system, various outputs depict the 
behavior of many elements of interest such as the number of “Terrorist Human 
Resources” and the number of violent acts against the U.S., among others. This valuable 
step allows the user to better understand the system and generate ideas to improve the 
behavior of specific stock elements in the model. 
The observation and continuous analysis of the depicted behavior is the basis for 
the conclusion, as well as any recommendations, presented in this project. Again, the idea 
is to serve as a foundation for the study of complex systems, such as terrorism, using the 
modeling techniques and tools available for the study of dynamic systems. 
 23
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. SYSTEMS THINKING MODELING APPROACH 
System dynamics29 is a method for analyzing problems in complex systems; it is 
based on a stock30  and flow31 structure, designed for modeling systems with numerous 
variables and delays between those variables. Highly complex dynamic systems tend to 
be virtually impossible to solve mathematically; therefore, the generally accepted and 
most rational approach to study them is to simulate the behavior of those systems in a 
computer with the aid of modern simulation software.   
Making accurate quantitative predictions with systems like terrorism can be quite 
challenging. In these systems, numerical data on areas such as terrorist economic 
resources, infrastructure, and attack capabilities are sometimes impossible to obtain 
and/or difficult to estimate. Although researchers have leeway to make many 
assumptions, it is still quite difficult to assess terrorist groups, given the anonymity of and 
deceiving trails often left by these authors of pain. Therefore, an analysis focused on 
understanding the behavior modes of important elements of the problem (such as planned 
terrorist attacks and the number of terrorists) can definitely shed some light on the 
policymaking arena. The importance of focusing on the pattern rather than aiming to 
provide point predictions about specific variables (e.g., the number of terrorist attacks 
next year) is based on the fact that, since the data needed to make such predictions are 
mostly known to be inaccurate, they can produce inaccurate predictions. Conversely, by 
using system dynamics modeling, we can simulate behavior of a system based on a valid 
(accepted by the public) array of characteristics and behavioral elements of the problem 
being analyzed (e.g., terrorist groups’ beliefs and effect of U.S. troops in the Middle 
East). By studying and understanding the resulting behavioral pattern, it is possible to 
find  ways to affect the observed behavior  and make changes to its pattern.  Furthermore,  
                                                 
29 Originally introduced as “Industrial Dynamics” by MIT’s Jay W. Forrester (Forrester, 1961). 
30  Stock: Pool or inventory where accumulation of elements takes place. 
31  Flow: Rate at which elements move through the system. 
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this would certainly lead to a better understanding of the problem and would facilitate the 
creation of a platform that would allow analysis and testing of policies aimed at its 
solution.  
The problem of terrorism is very complex (given the magnitude of elements that 
are known to cause it). Terrorism obviously has a feedback structure (since the elements 
within the system receive and produce feedback when interacting with each other) and it 
has dynamic properties (the system changes and reacts to changes in its elements). 
Therefore, a dynamic modeling approach can better serve the objectives set forth in this 
project than can a study of the statistical correlation between variables that, as said 
before, are realistically difficult to quantify accurately and that may not be an appropriate 
platform for policy testing in any case (because the system changes constantly). 
Furthermore, a dynamic modeling approach based on accepted theory about factors that 
directly motivate its behavior, and integrating other exogenous (external) factors that can 
also affect its behavior, would result in a more appropriate vehicle for policy analysis 
than relying on statistical regression analysis of historical data or doubtful estimations.  
The preceding argument is not intended to imply that there are no possible ways 
in which statistical or probabilistic models could capture the problem presented. It 
implies, rather, that a dynamic approach, aided by a friendly interface, can serve as a 
useful tool for analysis of the presented problem without the need for a high level of 
mathematical and statistical competency from the reader. 
B. PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTIONS  
Again, terrorism as a whole is a very complex problem with thousands of 
variables, feedback loops, stocks, flows and nonlinearities created by the interaction of 
the physical and unique structure of the players. Attempting to capture the behavior of the 
whole system in a simulation model is an enormous task that may, nonetheless, provide 
the closest approximation of reality in a virtual environment. However, this closeness 
could become as complicated as the problem in real life and may not be useful for policy 
analysis. Conversely, concentration in a specific area of the problem of interest may be 
the key to attacking the problem as a whole. In this project, the key area of interest is 
Terrorist Human Resources. Middle Eastern terrorist attacks of high lethality are typically 
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carried out by highly organized terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda or Hezbollah. It is 
assumed that a reduction in the memberships of these groups may have a reinforcing32 
effect on their operability and their functionality. In other words, a reduction of the 
number of members of terrorist groups (Terrorist Human Resources) will obviously cause 
a reduction of the strength of these groups as well as a reduction of the support given to 
them. Although any competent person can arrive at the preceding conclusion without the 
aid of a computer model, the key item here is how to produce strategies that can 
effectively help reduce this factor, given the structure’s complexity and the governing 
dynamic of the entire system. It is important to remember that there are many obvious 
strategies that tend to backfire when implemented; this is why it is crucial to look at the 
entire system in the policymaking arena. For instance, consider the impact of overt 
military operations such as those carried out during “Iraqi Freedom”: while many of its 
primary objectives (e.g., depletion of insurgents) were achieved, it also produced an 
unexpectedly adverse effect. As suspected terrorists and insurgents were killed by 
American troops during daily operations, anti-American sentiment was reinforced by 
such things as grief for the dead and the treatment of the general population during 
searches, thus stimulating local and international recruitment and adding many more 
bodies to the insurgency, an insurgency that has claimed more U.S. soldiers’ lives than 
did the country’s regular military forces during the initial invasion. Conversely, forces 
from other nations also in-country (e.g., El Salvador, Dominican Republic) did not suffer 
such losses. The preceding example illustrates the need to identify dynamic structures 
and to account, not only for a single element of interest (deplete insurgency), but also for 
the related elements that can unexpectedly respond to feedback and thus significantly 
affect the expected results.  
C. THE MODEL 
In an attempt to ensure the credibility and reliability of this dynamic modeling 
analysis, the authors’ first priority was to base their ideas for the construction of the basic 
model only on generally accepted theories and official sources in order to avoid the 
                                                 
32 Reinforcing: A positive feedback relationship concept that tells us that given two things related to 
each other, if one thing decreases, the other will decrease or vice versa.   
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“garbage in, garbage out” effect33. This approach was important to ensure an unbiased 
and reliable platform that would allow the user to study the dynamic implications of 
terrorism, policy testing and analysis in a virtual environment, or simply to serve as 
starting point for more in-depth modeling development and related further research.  
The modeling phase can be said to be divided into two stages, the first being the 
re-creation of the situation with Middle Eastern terrorism against the United States as it is 
today, based on historical behavioral data and on the concepts and assumptions described 
in the official sources used. The idea is to describe the current behavior of certain 
variables of interest, for instance, “Terrorist Human Resources” or “Number of Terrorist 
Violent Actions Per Month”. What are the trends? Do they appear to be changing? Are 
they oscillating? By studying these behavioral patterns, as well as the dynamic 
implications of other related factors that affect their behavior, it may be possible to 
determine ways to produce the desired effect.  The second phase builds upon the basic 
model; it includes modifications to original parameters that enable us to affect the current 
behavior of those stocks of interest. These new modifications will shed light on the area 
of policymaking, as sensitivity analysis of these changes may help us to identify the areas 
that need to change in order to achieve the desired results. The modeling phase extends 
across Chapter III and Chapter IV. 
D. PREVIOUS WORK ON THE SUBJECT  
Although terrorism itself is a hot topic and there are a vast number of in-depth 
studies and papers available on the subject, very little was found about dynamic analysis 
of terrorism among the many excellent assessments. The Dynamic Terrorist Threat34 
(DTT) was of extreme usefulness due to its unique strategic and dynamic perspective on 
the problem. Specifically, the following quotation describes the main objective pursued: 
 
  
                                                 
33 “Garbage in, garbage out”; Popular modeling argot that means that no matter how good the model 
is, if you put unreliable data in you will get unreliable data out. 
34  Kim Cragin et al for the United States Air Force, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat, An Assessment 
of Groups Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World”, RAND Corporation, CA, 2004. 
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 DTT attempts to develop a matrix that helps policymakers identify the 
threat that terrorist groups pose to the United States. It assesses how 
terrorists adapt and change, to identify such groups’ vulnerabilities. By 
combining these two approaches, the study was able to suggest options 
that policymakers could use to refine the U.S. government 
counterterrorism policies.35  
The DTT project uses statistical analysis of historical data, as well as reliable 
expert opinion, to formulate important decision matrixes that provide valuable insight to 
both policymakers and curious readers. According to the DTT report, the authors were 
able to evaluate the relative threat to the U.S. posed by terrorist groups through 
assessment of existing terrorist threats to the United States, utilizing an analytical 
framework that allowed them to compare the motivations and capabilities of terrorist 
groups against each other. They developed this framework by starting with an 
examination of historical patterns of terrorist activities.36  
Specifically, the DTT report ranked terrorists from most to least threatening, 
based on the number of attacks they have carried out against U.S. and other Western 
targets within a specific time frame. Alternatively, The DTT report assessed the strengths 
and weaknesses of a specific group according to its modus operandi, number of fighters, 
and degree of support, but did not systematically compare it with the threat posed by 
other terrorist organizations. This is logical in the short run; however, it does not provide 
policymakers with a sense of how terrorist group capabilities could change over time. 
Similarly, this approach does not take into account the threat posed by groups that have 
not  recently  carried  out  an  attack  against  U.S.  targets,  but  rather  have   spent   time 
deepening the anti-U.S. sentiment of their members and supporters. The DTT report 
argued that these seemingly inactive groups might pose a more significant threat to the 
United States in the medium-to-long term. 
                                                 
35 Kim Cragin et al. 
36 The numbers presented in the original DTT report were drawn from the RAND Terrorism 
Chronology and the RAND-MIPT [National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism] Terrorism 
Incident Database, unless otherwise noted. A version is available on the Internet: 
http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp. [last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
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The DTT served this project as a school of thought and foundation for the 
formulation of formulas and assumptions that were incorporated into the basic model and 
helped to create and quantify important variables such as terrorist groups’ strengths, 
capabilities and productivity, among others. The incorporation of relevant factors found 
in the report helped to produce a more consistent basic model that will behave in a more 
realistic way.  
E. CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM 
As discussed in the previous chapter, dynamic systems can be graphically 
represented using causal loop diagrams, among other available graphical tools. These 
diagrams include the ideas, variables and conditions that will support the construction of 
a dynamic model, which will serve as a tool for the exploration of the possible effects of 
the implementation of policies aimed at reducing Middle Eastern groups’ acts of 




Figure 5.   Causal Loop Diagram of Middle Eastern Groups Terrorism against the 
U.S. As Proposed by the Authors of this Project 
 
The causal diagram shown in Figure 5 can be interpreted in the following way 
(from top to bottom):  
a. As the U.S. increases its investment (military bases and troops, in terms of 
funds invested) in the Middle East region, the anti-U.S. sentiment (as felt by extremist 
and/or anti-American groups) in the region increases. Also, as U.S. investment in the 
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b. As the anti-U.S. sentiment increases, this sparks the hatred of anti-American 
extremist groups, who feel that the U.S. presence in the Middle East threatens the Islamic 
conservative way of life, as well as the sovereignty of the Islamic nations in the region. 
Hence, those groups use religion, force and/or political causes to obtain resources and 
recruit more members. Therefore, Terrorist Human Resources (recruitment) increase. 
c. As Terrorist Human Resources increase, terrorist sophistication (strength, 
lethality and/or capability) increases, and as terrorist sophistication increases, the number 
of planned terrorist attacks against the U.S. increases. Also, as Terrorist Human 
Resources increase, the number of planned attacks increases. 
d. As the number of planned terrorist attacks against the U.S. increases, the 
number of killed (casualties resulting from the attacks) increases.  
e. As the number of killed increases, U.S. terrorism defense resource allocation 
(defensive measures and action to avoid similar or other possible attacks) increases.  
f. As U.S. terrorism defense resource allocation increases, U.S. counterterrorism 
actions (offensive military or non-military operations against terrorist targets) increase. 
g. As U.S. counterterrorism actions increase, they have multiple effects on several 
variables; the effects are described as follows:  
(1) The U. S. terrorism defense resource allocation decreases.  
(2) The number of killed (victims from terrorism) decreases.  
(3) The anti-U.S. sentiment increases. Friends and/or relatives of alleged terrorists 
that are killed during overt operations will reject their deaths, and thus may come 
to feel stronger about the anti-American cause.  
(4) The U.S. military investment in the Middle East increases. The U.S. will need 
to mobilize more resources and thus spend more funds to operate and sustain 
control. 
h. As U.S. antiterrorism actions increase, the U.S. terrorism defense resources 
allocation will decrease (as more funds are spent); it will also decrease the number of 
killed (victims from the attacks). 
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The objective of the causal loop analysis is to use the relationships depicted in the 
diagram as a backbone for the model (logic of relationship between the existing 
variables). Specifically, it is intended for use as a starting blueprint for a more detailed 
dynamic model, using state-of-the-art software. 
F. MODELING SOFTWARE 
The modeling software selection, for the purpose of this project, was mainly 
based on the quality of the program, as well as the reputation and reliability of the source 
company. The program is called STELLA® and was created by ISEE Systems™ 
(formerly High Performance Systems), which specializes in general systems 
improvement.37 The company was founded as a privately held company in 1985 by a 
professor at Dartmouth College. It is worth mentioning that in 1987 the company was 
awarded the Jay Forrester prize for the introduction of STELLA ®. Additionally, it has 
partnered with the Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation to create a line of 
interactive Learning Environments focused on key strategic business issues.   
G.  DATA USED 
One of the most important priorities for the authors was to ensure the reliability of 
the assumptions used in this study. The collection of numerical data for this project was 
not as extensive as it typically is in quantitative research. However, instead of being 
limited to a string of values in historical order, it included ideological38 information about 
terrorist groups based on expert opinion and official or publicly accepted theories; these 
help explain behavior as well as providing means for its quantification.  Statistical 
information about the number of members per terrorist group and attacks per region, 
among others, was obtained through reliable and fully functional internet sites for 
illustrational purposes rather than for producing accurate point predictions in the 
modeling process, although it is possible to use these to compare the behavior exhibited 
in the model with past trends. 
                                                 
37 Information source: http://www.iseesystems.com/AboutUs.aspx [last accessed March 09, 2005]. 
38 Ideological in this case refers to behavioral characteristics that will be part of the feedback structure 
of this system, for instance, what motivates terrorist violent actions against the U.S. or its acceptance of 
U.S. presence on the Middle East.  
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Again, the idea is that quantitative data are necessary to fuel the system and to 
create the formulas that will produce flows and accumulations throughout the system; 
however, the main focus will still be on the behavioral pattern rather than on the resulting 




A. DYNAMIC MODEL OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM AGAINST 
THE UNITED STATES 
As indicated earlier, the modeling section of this project is divided into three 
sections: the U.S. resource accumulation in the Middle East in monetary terms, called 
“U.S. Military in the Middle East”; the re-creation of the situation with Middle Eastern 
terrorism against the U.S. as it is viewed by the public today, called “Terrorist Groups”; 
and the U.S. allocation of resources in anti-terrorism investment and counter-terrorism 
investment, what we have termed “U.S. Resource Allocation for War on Terrorism”. 
The basic model stands out as one of the most important steps in this project. This 
is the backbone of the analysis: in this stage, the authors seek to model the problem of 
Middle Eastern terrorism against the U.S.  The aim is to achieve an acceptable closeness 
to reality (realistic within reasonable boundaries) by adding what we believe are the 
critical elements to the structure.  While the complexity of the problem on hand has been 
stressed repeatedly in this paper, it is important to point out that only some specific areas 
of interest will be integrated into the model.  
Focusing on two key variables rather than trying to map the whole problem 
produced more reliable results, and thus further understanding of these areas. This 
approach should serve well as a tool for decision making. The major areas of focus were: 
Terrorist Human Resources and Fatal Victims of Terrorism (people killed per month). 
Again, one does not need a model to deduce that if these two variables were to be 
reduced, the problem itself would likewise be brought more under control. However, an 
in-depth study of the resulting dynamic interactions and existing non-linearities between 
these variables and their environment should make valuable contributions to the 
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Figure 6.   The basic model as seen from the Stella interface  
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2. Model Components 
The model is divided into three sections: (a) U.S. Military in the Middle East, (b) 
Terrorist Groups, and (c) U.S. Resource Allocation for War on Terrorism. Each section 
captures a part of the problem. 
U.S. Military in the Middle East captures the U.S. level of involvement in the 
Middle East, expressed in monetary terms (U.S. Dollars). This involvement includes, but 
is not limited to, military offensive and other operations in the region, as well as military 
support to Israel, Pakistan and Jordan, among others. 
The Terrorist Group section captures how the said U.S. involvement in the region 
affects the behavior of terrorist groups in the Middle East. The logic applied implies that 
U.S. presence and investment catalyze actions and responses in these groups.  
The last section, U.S. Resource Allocation for War on Terrorism depicts the 
distribution of resources per U.S. policy. The resources being analyzed consist of U.S. 
investments in counter- and anti-terrorism allocated for the Middle East region. 














U.S. Military in Middle East
 
Figure 7.   US Military in the Middle East Section 
As stated before, U.S. Military in the Middle East (Figure 7) captures U.S. 
level of involvement, in monetary terms, within the Middle East. Its primary source of 
resources is U.S. counter-terrorism investment. The investment flow is the hose that 
channels these resources into and out of the U.S. military investment stock. This flow is 
affected by a variable that represents the incremental rate of counter-terrorism investment 
in the region.  The level of military involvement of the U.S. with the Middle East is 
captured by the stock called “U.S. Military Investment in the Middle East”. This stock 
also  interacts  with a  variable  called  “Incremental  Rate of U.S.  Military  Investment in  
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M.E. (described in the second section of the model, Terrorist Groups).  The depletion rate 
of the level is through the investment outflow. Investment outflow is the speed at which 
investment resources are used.  
The following is a description of each of the components that interacts in 
this section of the model (the same format will be also used for subsequent sections). It 
depicts the units of measurement, important assumptions, parameters and a simplified 
explanation of their relationship with the model. A more mathematically oriented 
depiction of the relationship of each variable can be found in appendix A (Formulas). 
(1) U.S. Counter-Terrorist Investment: This is simply a connection 
to the remotely located U.S. counter-terrorism investment stock, which holds the amount 
of resources, in monetary terms (U.S. dollars), allocated for counter-terrorism activities. 
The numbers used to quantify its initial stock include the approved budget for Iraqi 
Freedom and the corresponding Department of State allocations in support of counter-
terrorism activities. Those allocations totaled approximately $53.8 billion (approx. $48.1 
billion for the Department of Defense and $5.7 billion for the Department of State) in the 
year 200339. The model makes a distribution at a rate equal to “counter-terrorism inflow” 
with a delay of six months--lag time from appropriation to the allocation of money--at a 
rate of $4.48 billion per month. A more detailed explanation of these dollar figures is in 
Investment Outflow.  
(2) Incremental Rate of U.S. Counter-Terrorism Investment: The 
incremental rate of U.S. counter-terrorism investment is the difference between the initial 
investment and the current investment (current/initial). This can be either an increase or a 
decrease. It is directly related to the investment flow that goes to U.S. military investment 
in the Middle East. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of 
Defense, April 18, 2003. Available on the Internet: 




(3) Investment Inflow: The investment flow of funds for military 
investment is given by the availability of resources. That is, as the U.S. counter-terrorism 
investment becomes more productive, fewer resources should be needed to obtain the 
same results. The starting point for this parameter is the monthly U.S. military investment 
in the Middle East ($48.1 billion/12-month period).  
(4) U.S. Military Investment in the Middle East: This is a measure 
of the U.S. involvement in the Middle East in monetary terms (U.S. Dollars). The 
decision to use dollar terms was preferred over using military troops alone (number of 
soldiers), because this will capture the diversity of both military and political efforts in 
the region in a more generic way. Furthermore, this approach allows us to capture not 
only troops, but also equipment, allies’ support, diplomatic pressure or support linked to 
military investment, among others. This is the state of the system; a greater state of the 
system leads to a slightly greater net inflow and a still larger addition to the stock40. In 
this case, we are facing a positive feedback loop coupling the stock and its net inflow.   
According to Dov Zakheim41, the war on terror in the Middle East 
in 2003 was costing about $48.1 billion per year. Iraqi Freedom cost $2 billion a month. 
Enduring Freedom, the original name for the Afghanistan campaign, cost $1.6 billion per 
month four years ago. Now it is still high at $1.1 billion42 per month. Mobilizing troops 
and equipment cost $167 million a month, accumulating to two billion dollars in 
mobilization costs per year. In terms of ammunition, the spending amount is $250 million 
per month, or $3 billion per year. Another important factor is the combat pay raise 
authorized in 2003, $375 million per month including benefits, totaling $4.5 billion per 
year. Another interesting use of funds is funding for allies. For example, the Department 
of  Defense  has  earmarked  $1.4  billion  for allies such as Pakistan; the U.S. reimburses  
                                                 
40 Sterman, John D. Business Dynamics, Chapter 8 Closing the Loop: Dynamics of Simple Structures. 
41 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of 
Defense, April 18, 2003. Available on the Internet: 





Pakistan for stationing its troops in the northwestern part of that country. Jordan also will 
receive money for its help in the War on Terrorism, as many countries do. The dollar 
accumulation stock--the state of the system--is about $48.1 billion. 
(5) Investment Outflow: Investment outflow is the rate at which 
U.S. military investment in the Middle East is depleted. Investment outflow can differ 
significantly from investment inflow because they are governed by different decision 
processes. The initial value for this outflow is given by the current rate of expenditure in 
support of U.S. military operations (directly or indirectly), but including a delay of six 
months from allocation to expenditure. This assumption is based on typical military 
acquisitions cycle times and can be changed accordingly for sensitivity analysis, which 
will be shown in the next chapter. As mentioned before, the initial outflow of funds for 
these related activities is approximately $4 billion per month. 
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Figure 8.   Terrorist Groups Component 
In Chapter I, we saw that terrorist groups are negatively influenced by the 
U.S. military expenditures (investment, presence) in the Middle East. That investment is 
considered a sort of invasion of their land and their Muslim way of life (faith). This 
investment  brings  about  anger  and  anti-U.S.  sentiment,  and  consequently  builds  the  
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foundation for anti-U.S. demonstrations and actions against the U.S., domestically as well 
as against U.S. interests abroad. Those actions are built on terrorist capacity to gather 
resources (human, financial, and material, among others). This section gathers:  
(1) Incremental Rate of U.S. Military Investment in the Middle 
East: The incremental rate of U.S. military investment in the Middle East is the relation 
between new investment and the current investment rate (new/current). An increase in 
military investment (more troops, more ammunition, and more allied support) will 
indicate an increase in the capacity to carry out operations, both covert and overt. This is 
the main source of anger for Middle East terrorism, and the U.S. capacity to act in the 
region.   
(2) Anti-U.S. Sentiment: To evaluate the Middle East groups’ anti-
U.S. sentiment, we separated the twin criteria of intentions and capabilities43 in order to 
use the intentions indicator44. The intentions indicator is based on five degrees of anti-
U.S. sentiment; this scale was developed by RAND45 and is used for estimating the level 
of intention of particular terrorist groups (mostly Middle Eastern) to attack the U.S. 
homeland and U.S. interests overseas. RAND calls this measurement “Intent 
Spectrum46”. The context of this measurement is similar to our anti-U.S. sentiment 
variable; thus it is used in our variable’s construction, and its value is set at .33 (33%). 
Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment is the interaction of the “Incremental Rate of U.S. 
Investment in the Middle East” times (*) one, plus (+) the anti-U.S. intent proportion of 
the intent spectrum. It is worth restating here that measurements of intangible elements  
like anti-U.S. sentiment are extremely difficult and subjective. Among the few available 
sources, RAND appeared to be the best source of these parameters, due to its high level 
of acceptance and reliability. 
                                                 
43 Kim Cragin et al, p. 7. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 The spectrum used here is given by the range of intent against the U.S. and U.S. interests, both 
domestic and foreign. We have a range from 1 to 5 of anti-U.S. sentiment, giving 15 possible results. The 
number 5, as the highest intent, represent a 33% use of the spectrum; hence 5/15 is used as a multiplier of 
planned terrorist attacks. 
 
 40
(3) Recruiting Productivity: Recruiting productivity of terrorists is 
a function of recruiting and the level of anti-U.S. sentiment. On the one hand, recruiting 
data are a combination of official and unofficial sources, interpolating the population in 
question. On the other hand, anti-U.S. sentiment is based on indicators of terrorist 
groups’ intentions47.  
Jihadi publications like Ghazwa, Majalla, Zarb-e-Taiba, 
Shamsheer and Zarb-e-Momim reveal that between January and June 2003, the various 
groups recruited more than 7,000 individuals aged 18-25 years from various parts of 
Pakistan48. This parameter used for recruitment productivity is based on these 
publications. It is known that recruitment varies from country to country; however, the 
current antiterrorism efforts by the Pakistan government and the cultural similarities 
shared with the rest of the Middle Eastern countries make it an appropriate measurement 
of recruiting rate for the Middle East as a whole. This is preferred because at the moment 
similar information for countries such as Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan is not readily 
available from reliable sources. Also, averaging estimations throughout the region may 
result is a wider separation between the model and acceptable levels of realism; this is 
another intangible and difficult measure that can be adjusted in future studies.  
The details about our measurement can be summarized as follows:  
7,000 individuals divided by the Pakistani49 population, times (*) the number of countries 
(Middle East), with the result then divided by the time frame of the information (six 
months) to get the monthly rate of recruiting. Pakistan’s population is 159,196,336 (July 
2004 estimated), so Rate = (7,000/159 million) / 6 months = 7.34 per million/month. The 
                                                 
47 Kim Cragin et al for the United States Air Force, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat, An Assessment of 
Groups Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World”, RAND Corporation, CA, 2004. 
RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database 
48 Mohammad Shehzad, Interior Ministry of Pakistan, Jihad recruitment is on the rise. The Friday 
Times. Available on the Internet: http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.php?story=20030729154610902 
[last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
49 We use Pakistan as our gauge for recruiting because according to Marc Sageman’s studies terrorist 
groups, in this case Al-Qaeda, grew in their jihad war spontaneously, leaving them vulnerable to the 
uncoordinated preferences of potential candidates. Therefore, they tried to remedy this by training their 
members in Afghanistan. After the success of the war on terrorism, they fled to Pakistan, where they 
currently train their members. 
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Middle East’s population is 259,499,772 (2004 estimated)50. Then, recruitment per 
million is multiplied times the population. Rate = 7.34 x 259.5 million = 1,904.73 which 
is approximately 1,905 new recruits per month. 
(4) Human Resources Inflow: The main source of resources in our 
model is from recruiting. Recruiting by itself would be useless without the ignition 
provided by financial resources. At the same time recruiting is not instantaneous. It has a 
delay of approximately 12 months due primarily to selection, training, and deployment, 
according to Marc Sageman51.  
(5) Terrorist Human Resources: This is an important stock that 
buffers the differences between human resources depletion (an elimination rate) and 
human resource inflow (a product of recruiting productivity times (*) anti-U.S. 
sentiment).  
Furthermore, Terrorist Human Resources are determined by the 
sum of known members of each Middle East terrorist group operating against the U.S. 
The number totaled 59,200 active members52. One characteristic of this stock is that its 
input lags behind its output due to the recruiting process. Hence, the recruiting process 
becomes an important ally in understanding the size phenomenon. This stock 
characterizes the state of the system and can provide the basis for actions53. For example, 
this can be used to measure the response force needed to counteract terrorist activities and 
planning.   
 (6) Resource Depletion: Resource depletion is the rate of 
reduction due to factors such as killing and capture. It is increased as a factor of attacks 
made by the U.S. Without other exogenous factors the rate will remain as it is now, with 
approximately 430 dead per month. 
                                                 
50 Internet World Stats. Available on the Internet:  www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm. [last 
accessed April 29, 2005]. 
51 Foreign Policy Research Institute, Marc Sageman, Senior Fellow FPRI, Available on the Internet: 
www.fpri.org/enotes [last accessed April 29, 2005]. 
52 From figures given in Table 3 and Table 6. 
53 Sterman, John D. Business Dynamics, Chapter 6: Stocks and Flows. 
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(7) Attacks by U.S.: This is the product of the incremental rate of 
U.S. military investment in the Middle East times (*) a ratio of one. The capacity to strike 
Middle Eastern terrorism is a function of the military investment in the Middle East; this 
is a simple technical parameter to ensure that the increments of money added to the 
original stock are fully utilized (100% utilization); furthermore, that amount also 
represents the power or capability of attack by the U.S., and affects directly the number 
of terrorists killed (depletion).  
(8) Resource Defection: Resource defection (terrorists deserting) is 
the product of the incremental rate of counter-terrorism investment times (*) the pool of 
human resources. From a conservative standpoint, the rate being used for the level of 
defection among terrorists is 10%; this percentage will interact with the incremental rate. 
Again, this is another parameter that is subjective and cannot be accurately quantified due 
to a lack of reliable information on the subject. The figure used is simply assumed and is 
just another parameter that can be adjusted in future runs. 
(9) Terrorist Sophistication: Terrorist sophistication implies the 
strength and capability of the terrorist groups; it is based on the twin criteria of intentions 
and capabilities54. The capabilities were set in accordance with five indicators of their 
strength. Those indicators are a set of five thresholds that were also developed by RAND; 
the strength thresholds are based on trends in terrorist activities over the past 30 years, 
overlaying this historical analysis with an assessment of more recent and emerging 
patterns. 
The thresholds are detailed herein. They are sorted in ascending 
order, in relation to the ability to cause casualties and terror: first level, kill or injure 50 or 
more people in a single attack; second level, intentionally target unguarded foreign 
nationals; third level, kill or injure 150 or more people in a single attack; fourth level, 
strike  at  guarded  targets; and fifth level, successfully coordinate multiple  attacks.  This  
                                                 
54 Developed from Kim Cragin and Sara E. Daly’s analysis of international terrorist attacks drawn 
from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. The RAND 
databases recorded approximately 3,800 international terrorist attacks from 1991 through 2000. 
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ability is multiplied by human resources. In this case, willingness to do any terrorist 
related action is not enough; that willingness must be accompanied by the capacity to 
carry out the action.  
(10) Terrorist Attack Productivity:  Attacks are generated by anti-
U.S. sentiment, times terrorist sophistication, times success rate. As a result for the initial 
terrorist attack productivity number, we have 0.65 attacks per month against the U.S. 
only. This number is the average number of attacks against the U.S. in the last 13 years, 
according to RAND. It is important to point out that the authors of these data remarked 
that by no means are the data intended to be used as an indicator of future terrorist 
attacks, but rather as an indicator of past performance; however, it is the only practical 
and reliable measure currently available.  
(11) Killed Inflow: This refers to the number of fatal victims of 
terrorist attacks; it is calculated by multiplying the seriousness of the attacks by their 
productivity. The seriousness of the attacks is measured by the quality of preparation of 
the attacks, by their caused damage in terms of death count, and by the terrorist attacks’ 
productivity.   
(12) Seriousness of Attacks:  This is determined by the quality of 
the attacks, a measurement of the death toll by attacks perpetuated over time. The data 
utilized to quantify this variable cover a period of 13 years, as in Figure 9. Patterns of 
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks, in which 27 out of 101 attacks in a period of 13 years 
caused at least 150 deaths. Those 27 attacks correspond to a 26.7% possibility of 
occurrence of at least 150 deaths by a single terrorist attack.  
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Figure 9.   Patterns of Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. Source: from RAND MR1782 
Report 
 
(13) Success Rate: This is the number of successful terrorist 
activities carried out, divided by the total attempted; a 30% success rate is being assumed 
as an initial value. The higher the increases experienced in the Incremental Rate of U.S. 
Anti-Terrorism Investment are, the smaller the success rate of planned terrorist activities 
will be. 
(14) Incremental Rate of U.S. Anti-terrorism Investment: The 
incremental rate of U.S. anti-terrorism investment is the difference between the initial 
investment and the current investment (current - initial). This can be an increase or 
decrease and directly affects the depletion creativity.  
(15) Number of Killed per Month:  This is the rate of people killed 
by terrorist activities per month. This number can vary depending upon other factors. The 
goal of a successful policy is to reduce this number as a measure of success.  
(16) U.S. Anti-terrorist Investment:  This is the stock that holds the 
amount of funds (in U.S. dollars) used to prevent terrorism. The budget for Homeland 
Security55 is  used  to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., to reduce  vulnerability,  to  
                                                 
55 OMB, Mission of Homeland Security, Available on the Internet: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/homeland.html, [last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
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minimize damage, and to assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within the 
U.S. It is also used to monitor the connection between illegal drug trafficking and 
terrorism. The initial amount used in the model is $33.8 billion56.  
(17) Incremental Rate of U.S. Anti-terrorism Investment: This is 
the relationship between new investment and the current investment rate. An increase in 
anti-terrorist investment (more homeland security readiness) will indicate an increase in 
the capacity to respond to high-threat areas facing greater risks of terrorist attacks. 
(18) Depletion Creativity: This variable is 1.2 times the 
incremental rate of U.S. counter-terrorism investment and is equal to the incremental rate 
of U.S. anti-terrorism investment. It is assumed that counter-terrorism investment is more 
effective (by 20%) than anti-terrorism in the war against terrorism.  
(19) Killed Depletion: This is the rate of people saved per month 
due to U.S. efforts against terrorism. Those efforts are counter-terrorism and anti-
terrorism activities. The value assumed is 20 people, times depletion creativity. 
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Figure 10.   U.S. War on Terrorism (WOT) Resource Allocation 
The U.S. Resource Allocation for War on Terrorism is composed of all 
resources available in place to counter the terrorism threat. This allocation obeys a 
different set of policies toward the aforementioned enemy. The consequences of those 
policies and the subsequent resource distribution will determine the Anti-terrorism 
Resource Inflow, as well as the dynamics that follow in the Terrorist Groups part. The 
following lines contain a description of every component in this allocation:  
                                                 
56 2005 Discretionary Budget Authority, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Available on the 
Internet: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/homeland.html [last accessed June 01, 2005]. 
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(1) Net Increase Rate of Number of Killed: This is the difference 
between the number of people saved by U.S. investment in the Middle East and number 
of victims of terrorism, during a one-month period.  
(2) Replenishment Rate of U.S. WOT resources: This variable 
assumes that the incremental rate of fatal victims of terrorism (the number of killed) 
stimulates the U.S. to replenish its anti-terrorism resources at a rate of 10-12% per year 
(1% per month); the assumption is subjective and is another number that could be 
changed for sensitivity analysis purposes, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
(3) WOT Resource Inflow: This is the amount of resources 
allocated in response to terrorism attacks on the population (number of fatal victims). 
This feedback response allows U.S. anti-terrorism resource allocation to increase or 
decrease its level.  
(4) U.S. WOT Resource Allocation: This is the total amount of 
resources in place. It encompasses all kinds of resources--manpower, financial, 
equipment, etc.--available for distribution between U.S. counter-terrorism and U.S. anti-
terrorism investment. This pool of resources is determined by anti-terrorism resource 
inflow and counter-terrorism inflow. 
Due to the lack of data regarding the value of U.S. military 
resources, it was decided that using the total value of the budgets allocated for Operation 
Iraqi-Freedom, Homeland Security and the Department of State (issues related to 
terrorism fighting) would represent the best value for U.S. Military resources allocated 
for terrorism. Hence, U.S. anti-terrorism resource allocation includes $62.6 billion for 
Iraqi-Freedom, $33.8 billion for Homeland Security, and $5.78 billion allocated by the 
Department of State; this results in a grand total of $102.1 billion for the war on 
terrorism. 
(5) Anti-terrorism Inflow: This is the amount of resources from the 
U.S. anti-terrorism resource allocation to the U.S. anti-terrorism investment. This rate 
functions simultaneously as both an inflow and an outflow valve. We assume that this 
rate corresponds to the replenishment rate of U.S. anti-terrorism resources. This budget is  
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allocated evenly throughout the year. The rate used is derived from the $33.8 billion 
allocated to Homeland Security divided by 12 months, and is equal to $2.81 billion a 
month. 
(6) U.S. Anti-terrorism Investment: This is as described earlier in 
the U.S. Military Investment in the Middle East section. 
(7) Anti-terrorism Depletion Rate: This is the amount of U.S. anti-
terrorism investment consumed on a monthly basis. It is assumed that U.S. anti-terrorism 
investment is affected by a delay of 6 months from its resource allocation. 
(8) Counter-terrorism Inflow: As with anti-terrorism inflow, this is 
the amount of resources from the U.S. anti-terrorism resource allocation that goes to the 
U.S. counter-terrorism investment. This rate also functions as a simultaneous inflow and 
outflow; it is assumed that this rate corresponds to Replenishment Rate of U.S. Anti-
terrorism Resources. 
This budget is allocated evenly throughout the year. The rate is 
calculated by adding up the Iraqi Freedom allocation and the Department of State 
allocation for counter-terrorism ($62.6 billion and $5.78 billion, respectively), then 
dividing the total of $68.3 billion by the number of months in a year (12). This yields a 
rate of approximately $5.7 billion per month. 
(9) U.S. Counter-terrorism Investment: This is as described in the 
U.S. Military Investment in the Middle East component. 
(10) Counter-terrorism Depletion Rate. Counter-terrorism 
depletion rate is the amount of U.S. counter-terrorism investment used on a monthly 
basis. It is assumed that U.S. counter-terrorism investment corresponds to Counter-
terrorism inflow, and is assigned a 6-month delay for allocation and execution. 
The components as described in the previous sections provide the 
necessary feedback structure for the model to re-create the problem, as it exists. The next 




additional runs, as well as new results achieved from a “what if” perspective. It employs 
sensitivity analysis to show what would happen if some of the parameters or variables 
were modified. Additionally, the model is compared to data presented in the RAND 
report for analogy and validation purposes. 
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IV. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR 
The preceding chapter provided an explanation of the various components and 
assumptions behind the model. The next step is to explain what takes place when this 
model is executed. The relationship among variables was established in accordance with 
generally accepted theory and is consistent with reported terrorist activities.  
The overall behavior-dynamic pattern can be summarized thusly: while the direct 
cause of Middle East terrorism is complex and highly debatable, it is agreed that the U.S. 
presence in the Middle East (military-political-religious intervention, relationship with 
Israel, etc.) is one of the stronger motivators of anti-U.S. sentiment. This sentiment is 
exploited by already established terrorists and used in their efforts to recruit new 
members to support their cause. With a larger number of terrorists, they can achieve a 
higher level of sophistication (strength) and planning capabilities. This higher level of 
strength increases the chances of greater productivity, lethality and success in carrying 
out their attacks, and thus increases the chances of more people being killed. The 
response by the U.S. to the increase in the number of successful terrorist attacks has been 
to continue to escalate its presence in the Middle East as well as its investment in the war 
against terrorism (military campaigns and operations). The resulting behavior yields 
interesting observations over a time span of 5 years (60 months); the system behaves as a 
positive loop that feeds itself or reinforces the feedback received. To illustrate these 
observations, an overview of the variables of greater interest to this study is provided in 
the following sections. 
 B. GRAPHIC BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS 
An explanatory note is attached at the bottom of each graph. Note that the 
numbers on the vertical axis are the units of measurement of the variable being displayed 




1. Terrorist Human Resources 
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Figure 11.   Terrorist Human Resources and Recruiting Productivity in 5 years 
The stock of Terrorist Human Resources starts increasing from the initial default 
number of approximately 60,000 persons (terrorists from the Middle East region), to a 
maximum number of around 80,000 persons, as shown in Figure 11. Thereafter it 
oscillates between 80,000 and 65,000 persons. It is observed that the oscillation of the 
Terrorist Human Resources’ behavior is strongly affected by the behavior of Terrorist 
Recruiting Productivity, a primal function of Terrorist Human Resources’ inflow. 
Terrorist Human Resources’ stock continues to decline with each full oscillation. This 
decline is caused by the correlation among Resource Inflow, Resource Depletion and 
Resource Defection. Initially, Resource Inflow is dominant in this loop, even though it is 
constant in the first 12-month period. Human resources oscillation can be explained by 
U.S. counter-terrorist actions, which cause a drop in this level, as terrorist are killed in 
military operations. This situation leads to anger and desire for revenge, feelings which 
are fully exploited by terrorists by use as recruitment tools and which therefore lead to 
further increases in terrorist numbers. 
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Figure 12.   Resource Inflow, Resource Depletion and Resource Deflect 
In Figure 12, the temporary constancy displayed by the Resource Inflow--
referring to the recruitment of terrorists (Human resources)--is caused by a delay of 12 
months due primarily to selection, training, and deployment. However, total outflow of 
Resource Depletion (terrorists killed) and Resource Defection (deserters, no longer 
active) overturns the dominance in a little more than a month and thereafter. In sum, 
these variables experience minor fluctuations but do not display any major changes in the 
short run. Note that the unit of measure is person (Terrorist Human Resources). 
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Figure 13.   Terrorist Human Resources in 10 years 
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Figure 13 shows a long-run perspective of Terrorist Human Resources. The span 
is 10 years of observation and Terrorist Human Resources are almost settled down at the 
level of approximately 63,000 persons, on average, after six years.  
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Figure 14.   Number of Persons Killed per Month 
The variable pertaining to the number of persons killed per month starts 
increasing slightly from the initial number of 150 persons per month shown in Figure 14. 
Thereafter, it declines until it reaches the level of 60 persons in week nine. It then 
increases again up to 105 persons in week 35 with small oscillations, and finally declines 
to 50 persons at the end of the five years (60 months). 
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Figure 15.   Comparative View of the Variables: Terrorist Attacks Productivity, 
Terrorist Sophistication, Success Rate and Anti-US Sentiment 
The behavior of Killed Inflow is primarily determined by its parameter, Terrorist 
Attacks Productivity. Terrorist Attacks Productivity is a function of Terrorist 
Sophistication, Success Rate of Terrorist Attacks, and Anti-US Sentiment. Even though 
the overall decline of Terrorist Human Resources effects a reduction of Terrorist 
Sophistication, Terrorist Attacks Productivity increases dramatically until week 23 due to 
an increase of Anti-US Sentiment as shown in Figure 15. Conversely, the radical 
reduction of Success Rate of Terrorist Attacks is due to increased US Anti-terrorism 
Investment. After week 23, all elements affecting Terrorist Attacks Productivity reach a 
stable state of approximately three attacks per month. 
 
Terrorist Attacks Productivity 
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Figure 16.   Number of persons killed per month in 10 years 
It can be observed in Figure 16 that the Number of persons killed per month 
settles down at the level of approximately 20 fatalities per month in the long run. 
In conclusion, the model behaves in a very similar way to the real world. Most 
nations identify threats and respond to them upon being affected. They typically continue 
to respond to the threat in the same or greater proportion as they continue to be affected. 
According to this model, it appears that terrorism against the U.S. can be significantly 
reduced if the U.S. continues to increase its investment in the war against terrorism. 
Incremental increases of the investment seem to reduce the number of attacks in the 
observed timeframe. The current behavior of the model appears to satisfy the needs for 
which it was developed. 
The following section will examine the validity of those observations. 
C. VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 
To corroborate our model, we examined previous research on the subject of 
terrorism. We used the “Patterns in Lethality of Terrorist Attacks” presented in “The 
Dynamic Terrorist Threat” (DTT) published by the RAND Corporation in 2004. The 
behavior  observed  comes  from  the  RAND  Chronology  and  RAND-MIPT  Terrorism  
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Incident Database, which recorded approximately 3,800 international terrorist attacks. 
From those attacks, only the ones whose objective was the U.S. or U.S. interests were 















Figure 17.   Comparison of Terrorist Attacks Productivity and Average Number of 
Attacks in RAND DTT 
Here, we compare the behavior of Terrorist Attacks Productivity in our model 
with the Average Number of Attacks in RAND data, as shown in Figure 17. As RAND 
data are depicted as attacks per year, we converted these data into a monthly basis on 
average. In our model, terrorist attacks productivity starts low and then reaches an almost 
constant level at the rate of three attacks per month from the second year. The RAND 
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1996 (highlighted in red), and then varies as it increases to higher levels; however, this is 
historical data and the model shows a simulated behavioral pattern departing from the 
assumed feedback structure. There may be certain exogenous factors that we are unaware 
of, factors that may have triggered or influenced the observed historical increase in the 
number of attacks. Moreover, we were not able to take into account these unknown 




















Figure 18.   Comparison of Number of Killed per Month and RAND’s Historical 
Number of Killed per month 
 
From observing the model and the historical RAND data, we can infer that some 
correlation exits between them, in terms of cyclical behavior, as shown in Figure 18. The 
main difference is that RAND data present a historical pattern, whereas our model based 

















on historical data depicts the possible future trend of those casualties. However, the 
period from 47 months and on resembles the baseline in our model, the zero-to-ten-month 
period approximately, and the subsequent behavior. 
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
In order to get an inside look at the consequences of different changes in our 
model inputs, we conducted a sensitivity analysis that looked for clues to determine in 
which areas the terrorism issue is more susceptible. We started by probing the U.S. War 
On Terrorism (WOT) Resource Allocation.   
We attempted to determine how the model would behave by changing 
“Replenishment Rate of U.S. WOT Resources”. Herein we assumed that the incremental 
rate of fatal victims of terrorism (number of killed) would stimulate the U.S. to replenish 
its war on terrorism resources at a rate of 12% per year, as per Chapter III. 
We probed the replenishment rate of U.S. WOT resources using a range from 1 to 
100 percent. We used a very dramatic increase in resources to determine how Terrorist 
Human Resources and number of killed per month would react to large increases in U.S. 
investment; the figure depicts five trend lines, from one to five, valued at 1%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, and 100%, respectively.  
According to the aforementioned, we analyze the consequences of changing those 








































Figure 19.   Original Terrorist Human Resources Behavior and Sensitivity Analysis of 
Terrorist Human Resources 
The analysis shows that an increase in the replenishment rate of U.S. WOT 
resources will indeed reduce Terrorist Human Resources, as depicted in the previous 
figure. But at the same time, the sensitivity analysis reflects that Terrorist Human 
Resources will settle down at about 56,000 members. We can infer that investment alone 
will not end terrorism.  
To finish the sensitivity analysis on U.S. investment in the War on Terrorism, we 
analyzed its impact upon number of killed per month, as shown in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20.   Sensitivity Analysis of Number of Killed per Month 
 
We see a dramatic reduction in the number of killed per month, which is very 
interesting when compared with the behavior of Terrorist Human Resources, because it 
shows small correlation between the two. This runs counter to what we thought at the 
beginning, as per Correlation of Number of Killed per Month and Terrorist Human 
Resources depicted in Figure 21. These decreases seem exaggerated (lines 2 to 5) due to 
the assumptions behind the increases in the replenishment resources rate. However, this 
could be a useful finding, subject to deeper research, to determine the way in which the 
two correlate to one another. At the same time, the pattern of the number of killed per 
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Figure 21.   Correlation of Number of Killed per Month and Terrorist Human 
Resources 
 
Therefore, both Terrorist Human Resources and number of killed per month were 
reduced by increasing the U.S. investment in the war on terrorism; however, the number 
of killed per month is more sensitive. This indicates that even if terrorism remains, the 
number of killed is significantly reduced. Hence, the cost benefit, due to budget 
constraints, must be calculated by acknowledging an acceptable casualty level. 
After seeing the consequences on the sensitivity analysis of changing the 
replenishment rate of the overall U.S. war on terrorism resources, we moved to the 
observation of its two major components: U.S. counter-terrorism investment and U.S. 
anti-terrorism investment. We wanted to find out which allocation of resources is more 
effective in depleting Terrorist Human Resources and reducing the number of killed per 
month. Therefore, we did a sensitivity analysis on those components, changing the 
allocation ratio of total resources of the U.S. war on terrorism between the two. The range 
varies from 30 to 90 percent in counter-terrorism investment and 70 to 10 percent in anti-
terrorism investment. We used an unrealistic allocation to probe how Terrorist Human 
Resources, number of killed per month, and Terrorist Human Resources defection rate 
would  be  affected by the  sensitivity  analysis.  The  following figures depict  five  trend  
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lines, from one to five, valued at 30%, 45%, 60%, 75% and 90% of counter-terrorism 
investment allocation, respectively. The behavior of Terrorist Human Resources under 
different allocations is depicted in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22.   Terrorist Human Resources in Response to U.S. WOT Resource 
Allocation 
 
As one can see, Terrorist Human Resources is very sensitive to the amount 
allocated between counter-terrorism investment and anti-terrorism investment. It appears 
obvious that more counter-terrorism investment results in less Terrorist Human 
Resources. However, while a 90-percent allocation is more effective in terms of reducing 
Terrorist Human Resources it would, in the short run, vastly increase the number of killed 
per month to a level of more than 235 percent the observed killing rate, as shown in line 
five of Figure 23. Hence, the tradeoff here is to reduce Terrorist Human Resources along 
with the number of killed per month. As shown in line one of the same figure, an increase 
in U.S. anti-terrorism resources--70 percent, in this case--reduces the number of killed 
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on. Line two--55 percent--for U.S. anti-terrorism resources presents a similar pattern. 
Less than 40 percent in U.S. anti-terrorism resources does not reduce the number of killed 
per month in the short run, but it does result in a reduction in the middle to long run. 
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Figure 24.   Comparison of Sensitivity Analysis on Terrorist Human Resources and 
Number of Killed per Month affected by U.S. WOT Resource Allocation 
Comparing Terrorist Human Resources and the number of killed per month, as 
per Figure 24, we can deduce that a 60 to 75 percent counter-terrorism resource 
allocation--lines 3 and 4--coupled with a 40 to 25 percent anti-terrorism allocation 
appears to be the best allocation mix in terms of a reduction of Terrorist Human 
Resources and number of killed per month. Further research should be done to find out 
the best allocation mix of counter-terrorism resources invested in resource depletion, 
purely military investment, resource defection, and non-military activities. 
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In summary, anti-terrorism resource allocation is more effective in reducing the 
number of killed per month, while counter-terrorism resource allocation is more effective 





















V.    CONCLUSION 
A.  SUMMARY 
This project provides both a starting point and a strong foundation for the study of 
U.S. policies aimed at the war against terrorism in general, as well as those aimed at 
terrorism’s state sponsors from a systems thinking perspective57. The problem of 
terrorism involves a huge array of political complexities, strategic issues and national 
strategy elements that affect not only the U.S. but also the Middle East region. The 
dynamic approach proposed in this study would prove useful for the study of particular 
key elements that could lead to more informed decisions, and thus a better understanding 
of the problem. This project embraced “Number of Killed per Month” as a key area of 
interest as well as a gauge of effectiveness. However, it also paid special attention to 
“Terrorist Human Resources” as one of the key elements that directly affect the behavior 
pattern depicted by the Number of Killed per Month. The assumptions behind the model 
feedback structure are based on current accepted theory as well as on available expert 
opinion. 
 The resulting behavior demonstrated by the model shows that if the United States 
continues to increase its presence (Military Investment) in the Middle East, the number of 
terrorists (Human Resources) will be decreased gradually. This, in turn, will reduce the 
number of fatal victims of terrorism (Number of Killed) in the long run. This is good, in 
the sense that it implies that Middle Eastern terrorism activities against the U.S. would 
lose strength and the terrorists would suffer a decrease in their capabilities, essentially 
losing their ability to carry out high-lethality attacks (High Death Tolls). However, 
because these same practices might at the same time increase anger against the U.S., over 
a longer time frame the terrorist organizations will adapt, finding other means to effect 
attacks or increase their lethality in a period of time. This behavior is observed in the 
model if it is viewed from a long-run perspective (30 years). This result is obvious, in that 
overpowering the terrorists in the region will logically impair their ability to recruit more 
                                                 
57 System thinking refers to a systems dynamic modeling approach. 
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members and thus decrease their level of sophistication. In other words, terrorism will 
lose its strength. However, it is important to point out that the model also reveals that 
these terrorist groups do not cease to exist. This is both good and bad, in the sense that it 
shows the model’s similarities to real-life outputs but does not guarantee that there will 
be a definite and final solution to the threat of terrorism. Again, in real life there is a 
chance that attacks will be carried out so long as a single terrorist remains alive. 
However, there is a higher probability that the terrorist organizations will no longer be 
capable of high-lethality attacks, because their planning and execution capacities will be 
impaired due to low sophistication.  
The model also revealed that U.S. WOT Resource Allocation is a key element 
that plays a significant role in the reduction of terrorist activity. Furthermore, it reveals 
that anti-terrorism resource allocation is more effective in reducing the number of killed 
per month, while counter-terrorism resource allocation is more effective in reducing 
terrorist human resources. 
B.  FURTHER RESEARCH 
Future research using this approach could definitely produce more valuable 
insight, as well as more interesting results. In the modeling community, it is widely 
accepted that any model holds room for further improvements. However, there are always 
some specific areas that may need more improvement than others. In this particular case, 
the biggest issue is the reliability and availability of data about terrorist groups. This type 
of data has a subjective nature, because of the anonymity and deceptive behavior of 
terrorist groups. Given this limitation, one can only count on published research or 
government links as sources of information. Unfortunately, many are classified or 
restricted sources. This weakness could be overcome or diminished if the project were to 
be undertaken or assisted by an official agency or government entity that could provide 
access to more accurate information, or to those types of profile databases that typically 
require special clearance.  
In terms of solutions, the model showed that incremental investment and actions 
against terrorist groups can lead to a significant reduction in the number of people killed 
in attacks in the long run. An additional effective measure would be the incorporation of 
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an educational campaign aimed at discouraging recruitment of terrorists, either by 
exposing the crude and real fate of those who decide to join or by showing proof that 
religious messages are being misused by recruiters of terrorism. The impact of a carefully 
elaborated and strategically implemented anti-terrorism educational campaign on the 
Middle East could cause a significant reduction in terrorist recruitment, and thus 
contribute to a degradation of terrorist sophistication. With less human resources and 
with fewer supporters, the terrorists’ capacity to carry out substantial attacks against the 
U.S. would be significantly impaired. Further research about the impact of anti-terrorism 
educational campaigns in the Middle East region, and their dynamic implications for 
Middle Eastern terrorist groups, could give an interesting twist to the existing model as 
well as enhancing its applicability as a tool for policy testing. 
In summary, it is imperative that future researchers look into the political aspects 
of the problem, simply because the possible corrective policies or measures would always 
carry a political implication that could affect domestic and foreign affairs. The benefits 
from a study of this nature can be maximized when unbiased elements of foreign policy 
are brought to the table. The considerations discussed below are based on our 
observations of some of the major players in the world of politics and their views about 
the current war against terrorism. The idea is to illustrate that a model that accounts for 
the various key political perspectives, but maintains simplicity, would dramatically 
improve the benefits obtained in this study. Therefore, future research should concentrate 
mainly on the dynamics of the political position of key players in the Middle East and 
their willingness (in quantifiable terms) to join efforts in the war against terror, on a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of democratization in the Middle East (in quantifiable 
terms), and finally on more reliable sources of information about currently active terrorist 
groups. These considerations will illustrate some of the political aspects that can be 





C.  SUGGESTED CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
From a political perspective, the “antidote’s formula” of the United Sates against 
Middle East terrorism seems to be very complicated. The 9/11 Commission claims58 that 
“Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; 
and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, 
which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe.” However, at this 
point it is critical to distinguish the Arab nations and the Islamic world from Middle East 
Terrorism. Terrorists typically use religion as a vital part of their recruitment system and 
pervert religious causes to carry out their attacks. Furthermore, it is common throughout 
the world that ordinary people, driven by disappointment, misery, anger and failure in 
their personal lives, are the main targets as recruits to join terrorist organizations. As the 
9/11 Commission points out: “Frustrated in their search for a decent living, unable to 
benefit from an education often obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked 
from starting families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for 
radicalization59”. 
In order to search for an effective “antidote” in the fight against terrorism we have 
looked at different policies, such as the Israeli’s “shooting and crying60” counter-
terrorism policy, which imposes dramatic limitations on almost every aspect of civil 
liberties61. Another solution was found in the strategic teachings of Clausewitz, the 
solution of “exterminating” the enemy’s leadership or “neutralizing” the terrorist 
organizations by creating quarrels among them.  Unfortunately, history has shown that 
the aforementioned tactics have yielded poor results, specifically in the case of terrorism, 
mainly because the enemy is stateless and in most cases unidentified (anonymous). 
 
 
                                                 
58 Edward S. Walker Jr., Los Angeles World Affairs Council, September 9, 2004. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Benin Joel, No more Tears, (Middle East Report, Issue 230, Spring 2004), p.39. 
61 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism (New York, Ferrar, Strausand Giroux, 2001), pp. 132-
146. 
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On the one hand, most Europeans believe that a major blow against Middle East 
Terrorism could be achieved if the U.S. ceases the implementation of its double-standard 
policy62 in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A closer cooperation between the U.S. and the 
European Union (E.U.) could be considered as the “golden cut” in the fight against 
terrorism. The E.U. is actually the closest neighbor to the Middle East region. It has also 
gained ground in terms of the trust and respect of the Arab world by using more 
systematically the rules of multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, a survey conducted by John 
Zogby63 in July 2004 reveals that the U.S. no longer appears as a reliable partner in Arab 
pubic opinion.  
On the other hand, the U.S. insists that the suppression of terrorism should be 
achieved only through a huge change in the geopolitical balance of the Middle East 
region. Colin Powell mentioned that “The power equation in the region has changed, and 
governments in the region have to adjust to the new strategic situation.”64 The peace 
between Egypt and Israel is doubtless the first step in that direction. Moreover, the U.S. 
has stated that the democratization of the Middle East region should act as a strong 
catalyst for terrorism control. However, many European researchers argue that the 
instability and chaotic atmosphere that resulted from the U.S. intervention in, and 
occupation of, Iraq is a clear indication that force alone is not the best approach to boost 
democratization in the Middle East. Moreover, it has been repeatedly implied by the 
media that U.S. policymakers need to revise the relevant policies to avoid future 
duplication of this phenomenon in other Middle East countries, and that they need also to 




                                                 
62 Arabs feel that the U.S. supports Israel not only with arms, but also in a moral way by neutralizing 
the U.N.’s resolutions against Israel with the use of its veto. 
63 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, (Washington, D.C. 
September, 2004), pp. 44-45. 
64 Lee Kuan Yew, The IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore, 2003, available on the Internet: 
http:/www.iiss.org/newsite/Shangri-la-more.php?itemID=10 
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In sum, a dynamic modeling approach accounting for the aforementioned key 
political implications, but structured in a simple way and supported with more reliable 
sources, could produce valuable insight for policymakers (e.g., the creation of variables 
that could resemble a unified approach to counter-terrorism, or a variable that resembles 
the results that could be obtained from an educational campaign to promote mutual 
values and understanding). However, an indispensable precondition that must be satisfied 
for the dynamic model to deliver its promises is that it must be unbiased. It must include 
all the various key political positions as feedback in the model structure, even if many of 
them are in contradiction with U.S. internal politics and lifestyle. The importance of a 
study of this nature is that it could help identify what can be done to correct our 
problems, taking into account our actions and their external dynamic implications for the 
rest of the world. 
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APPENDIX A:   FORMULAS 
1. Number__of_Killed_per_month(t) = Number__of_Killed_per_month(t - dt) + 
(KilledInflow_ - Killed_Depletion) * dt 
2. INIT Number__of_Killed_per_month = 150 
 
INFLOWS: 
3. KilldInflow_ = Seriousness_of_Attacks*Terrorist_Attacks_Productivity 
OUTFLOWS: 
4. Killed_Depletion = Depletion_Creativity*20 
5. Terrorist_Human_Resources(t) = Terrorist_Human_Resources(t - dt) + 
(Resource_Inflow - Resource_Depletion - Resources_Deflect) * dt 
6. INIT Terrorist_Human_Resources = 59200 
 
INFLOWS: 
7. Resource_Inflow = DELAY(Recruiting_Productivity,12) 
 
OUTFLOWS: 
8. Resource_Depletion = Attack_by_US*430 




10. US_AntiTerrorism_Investment(t) = US_AntiTerrorism_Investment(t - dt) + 
(Anti_Terrorism_Inflow - Anti_Terrorism_Depletion_Rate) * dt 
11. INIT US_AntiTerrorism_Investment = 33800000000/12 
 
INFLOWS: 
12. Anti_Terrorism_Inflow = US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation*.386 
OUTFLOWS: 
13. Anti_Terrorism_Depletion_Rate = DELAY(Anti_Terrorism_Inflow,6) 
14. US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation(t) = 
US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation(t - dt) + 
(Anti_Terrorism_Resource_Inflow - Counter_Terrorism_Inflow - 
Anti_Terrorism_Inflow) * dt 
15. INIT US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation = 87600000000/12 
 
INFLOWS: 




17. Counter_Terrorism_Inflow = US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation*.614 
18. Anti_Terrorism_Inflow = US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation*.386 
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19. US_Military__Investment__in_Middle_East(t) = 
US_Military__Investment__in_Middle_East(t - dt) + (Investment_Inflow - 
Investment_Outflow) * dt 
20. INIT US_Military__Investment__in_Middle_East = 48100000000/12 
 
INFLOWS: 




22. Investment_Outflow = DELAY(Investment_Inflow,6) 
23. US__CounterTerrorism_Investment(t) = US__CounterTerrorism_Investment(t - 
dt) + (Counter_Terrorism_Inflow - Counter_Terrorism_Depletion_Rate) * dt 
24. INIT US__CounterTerrorism_Investment = 53800000000/12 
 
INFLOWS: 
25. Counter_Terrorism_Inflow = US_AntiTerrorism_Resource_Allocation*.614 
OUTFLOWS: 
26. Counter_Terrorism_Depletion_Rate = DELAY(Counter_Terrorism_Inflow,6) 
27. Anti_US_Sentiment = 
Incremental_Rate_ofUS_Military__Investment_in_Middle_East*(1+5/15) 
28. Attack_by_US = 
Incremental_Rate_ofUS_Military__Investment_in_Middle_East*1 
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29. Depletion_Creativity = 
Incremental_Rate_of_CounterTerrorism__Investment*Incremental_Rate_of__US
_AntiTerrorism__Investment*1.2 
30. Incremental_Rate_ofUS_Military__Investment_in_Middle_East = 
US_Military__Investment__in_Middle_East/INIT(US_Military__Investment__in
_Middle_East) 
31. Incremental_Rate_of_CounterTerrorism__Investment = 
US__CounterTerrorism_Investment/INIT(US__CounterTerrorism_Investment) 
32. Incremental_Rate_of_US_Anti_Terrorism_Investment = 
US_AntiTerrorism_Investment/INIT(US_AntiTerrorism_Investment) 
33. Incremental_Rate_of__US_AntiTerrorism__Investment = 
US_AntiTerrorism_Investment/INIT(US_AntiTerrorism_Investment) 
34. Incremental_Rate_of__US_CounterTerrorism__Investment = 
US__CounterTerrorism_Investment/INIT(US__CounterTerrorism_Investment) 
35. Net_Increase_Rate_of_Number_of_Killed = IF(KilldInflow_-
Killed_Depletion<0) THEN 0 ELSE (KilldInflow_-Killed_Depletion) 
36. Recruiting_Productivity = 
Anti_US_Sentiment+(Terrorist_Human_Resources*.25) 
37. Replenishment_Rate_of_US_Anti_Terrorism_Resources = 
(Net_Increase_Rate_of_Number_of_Killed/100)+1 
38. Seriousness_of_Attacks = 150*.267 
39. Success__Rate = 1/Incremental_Rate_of_US_Anti_Terrorism_Investment*.3 
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40. Terrorist_Attacks_Productivity = 
(Anti_US_Sentiment*Terrorist_Sophistication*Success__Rate)*8.24*10^(-5) 
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